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A B S T R A C T
This paper is concerned with intelligent agents that are able to perform nonmonotonic
reasoning, not only with, but also about general rules with exceptions. More precisely, the
focus is on enriching a knowledge base Ŵ with a general rule that is subsumed by other
rules already there. Such a problem is important because evolving knowledge needs not
follow logic as it is well-known from e.g., the belief revision paradigm. However, belief
revision is mainly concerned with the case that the extra information logically conflicts
with Ŵ. Otherwise, the extra knowledge is simply doomed to extend Ŵ with no change
altogether. The problem here is different and may require a change in Ŵ even though no
inconsistency arises. The idea is that when a rule is to be added, it might need to override
any rule that subsumes it: preemption must take place. A formalism dedicated to reasoning
with and about ruleswith exceptions is introduced. An approach to dealingwith preemption
over such rules is then developed. Interestingly, it leads us to introduce several implicants
concepts for rules that are possibly defeasible.
1. Introduction
Assume a knowledge base Ŵ contains the rule If the switch is on then the light is on. When If the switch is on and the lamp
bulb is ok then the light is on needs to be introduced inside Ŵ, it seems natural to require this new rule to preempt the older
rule: it is no longer enough to know that the switch is on to be able to conclude that the light is on, it must additionally be the
case that Ŵ yields the information that the lamp bulb is ok. First, let us observe that a monotonic logic cannot capture such
dynamics of reasoning by simply adding the new rule. According to monotonicity, any conclusion drawn from a given set of
premises can still be inferred whatever additional premises happen to supplement this set. In such a logic, the statement
the light is on (concluded from the former rule and the statement the switch is on) is still concluded even though the second
rule is added, and, worse yet, regardless of any information stating that the lamp bulb is broken. Also, the usual approaches
to belief revision following the seminal work in [1] fail to address this issue directly because theymake the new information
to be set-theoretically unioned with Ŵ in case no inconsistency arises. In the paper, it is shown how solving the problem can
be done through specific contraction steps followed by an expansion one, as those operations are called in the belief revision
research area. Let us stress that moving to a nonmonotonic formalism where exceptions to rules depend on consistency
checks like adding If the switch is on and if it can be consistently assumed that the lamp bulb is ok, then the light is on does not
change the problem.
Technically, the problem can be described as follows: Given a set Ŵ of formulas and a rule R, what changes should Ŵ
undergo so as to inferR but not to infer anyR′ subsumingR? In symbols, where Ŵ. stands for Ŵ after these changes have
taken place,
Ŵ. |∼R and Ŵ. 6|∼R′
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Clearly, the problem first requires several matters to be settled. First, the syntax for rules (in which R,R′, . . . are ex-
pressed) is to be defined. Second, an inference relation (denoted |∼) allowing rules to be handled needs to be settled. Third,
a concept of implicant for rules expressing what does R′ subsuming Rmean needs to be proposed, before an approach to
solve the above preemption issue can be defined.
Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows. First, we analyze situations where a new belief requires the subsuming
ones to be expelled (but no means is provided to automatically identify such cases —it is not the aim of this paper). In the
following Section, a general formalism for representing rules with exceptions is introduced with the aim of encompassing
various logic-based approaches allowing such rules, including default reasoning. Section 4 introduces useful inference tools
to reason about such rules, while Section 5 connects the tools with default logic. In Section 6, a useful X-derivation concept
is proposed, allowing both plain formulas and rules to be inferred under the possible assumption of additional formulas or
other rules with exceptions. Sections 7 and 8 investigate concepts of implicant for rules with exceptions. The approach to
the preemption issue is then developed in Section 9, based on the X-derivation and the latter implicant concepts. Finally,
some avenues for future research are provided in the conclusion.
Throughout the paper, the following notations are used: ¬, ∨, ∧ and ⊃ denote the classical negation, disjunction,
conjunction and material implication connectives, respectively. When  is a set of formulas, Cn() denotes the deductive
closure of under a given logic, of which ‖− denotes the consequence relationship,⊥ denotes absurdity, and⊤ denotes any
tautology.
2. About new beliefs that require subsuming beliefs to be expelled
The focus in this paper is on rational agents that are equipped with sound and complete logical inference mechanisms
about beliefs. As modeled in the so-called AGM framework [1] that gave rise to the belief revision research area, the natural
situation where a rational agent is handling a new belief that is not conflicting with its previous ones, requires the belief to
be merely added to its set of beliefs.
As illustrated in the introduction, such a very simple schema is not universal and does not cover all possible situations. In
some circumstances, a new belief requires some former ones to be expelled even though inconsistency does not threaten.
In this paper, the focus is on new non-conflicting beliefs that are intended to prevail over preexisting ones. Prevailing
means here that the new belief must be adopted and other beliefs that logically subsume it must be expelled. In the lamp
example, If the switch is on then the light is on subsumes (i.e., has for strict consequence) If the switch is on and the lamp is ok
then the light is on andmust be expelled so that the new rule prevails. Thus, this study only concerns situations where a new
piece of information is given and when this new one must prevail over a pre-existing set of premises.
We believe that this occurs frequently in real-life. A typical situation is whenwe refine our knowledge and beliefs so that
we need to adopt amore precise rule and block less precise pre-existing ones, as in the lamp example. From a logical point of
view, a more precise information can be a strict deductive consequence of a more general one. Hence, the need to get rid of
the more general ones.
Let us stress that whenwewant a new rule if A and B then C to prevail, this does not entail that not B is a counter-example
for deriving C from A. Actually, C can perhaps also be obtained from A is true and B is false. For example, assume we refine
a medical diagnosis system. We might want to assert the rule If symptom1 and has-been-in-Africa then disease1 and want it
to prevail. So we need to reject If symptom1 then disease1 and adopt the new (more precise) rule. This does not require not
has-been-in-Africa to be a counter-example from deriving disease1 from symptom1. Disease1 could perhaps also be derived
when we have symptom1 and has-been-in-Amazonia, according to another rule.
Even more importantly, the need for a new piece of information to prevail over the preexisting subsuming premises is
actually neither restricted to the (intuitive) concept of “more precise" rules or “more precise" information. Actually, it need
not even be restricted to rules (and thus counter-examples to rules), nor to their syntax, but exists for any kind of formulas.
For example, assume that the pre-existing beliefs contain John is in his office or John is at home. The need to block subsumption
also occurs whenwewant the new, in some sensemore accurate, piece of information John is in his office or John is at home or
John is in his club to prevail. Interestingly, the language that we are going to develop to model rules also allows to represent
formulas that do not appear as rules from an epistemological point of view. The treatment allowing new beliefs to prevail
applies to them, too.
Some words of caution are needed here since we are using full and complete logical mechanisms. In standard logic, any
literal (namely, any possibly negated elementary fact) entails any rule having the literal as a consequent: Light is on entails
any possible rule having light is on as the consequent. Accordingly, when we enforce a rule that must prevail, wemight need
to get rid of elementary beliefs. In the paper, we always assume that every belief in a setŴ of premises can be expelled when
a new belief needs to prevail. On the one hand, applying the technique might thus require to leave outside Ŵ formulas that
must not be expelled in such a process. On the other hand, inmany problems involving the analysis of interacting rules, such
an analysismust be conductedwithout case-specific concrete data. For example, in rule-based expert systems, the rule-base
contains generic rules whereas the working memory contains data related to a specific case and temporary conclusions. In
such a specific context, our technique to make rules prevail must consider the rule-base only.
Interestingly, the approach that we present in this paper can appear as a combination of (forms of) multiple contraction
andexpansionoperators,whichhavebeen studied in the standardBoolean logic setting for belief revision (see [5] for a survey
on multiple contraction operators). In this respect, this paper is, for one of its facets, a generalization of some first results
about blocking subsumption in the standard Boolean case that were presented in [3] and for which rationality postulates
are proposed in [2]. In this paper, the preemption issue is investigated within the setting of a family of non-monotonic
logics allowing forms of default assumptions. The handling of complex reasonings involving rules with exceptions leads us
to elaborate reasoning paradigms that are not captured by existing (generalized) AGM-like frameworks.
3. PEC rules
These last three decades, many research efforts in the Artificial Intelligence community have been devoted to the logic-
based formalization of various forms of reasoning, especially defeasible ones, giving rise to large families of nonmonotonic
logics. Noticeably, some of themost popular tools to handle forms of defeasible reasoning remain rules with exceptions, e.g.,
in the form of defaults [6]. They permit an inference system to jump to default conclusions and towithdraw themwhen new
information shows that these conclusions now lead to inconsistency. Usually, such a default rule is based on logical formulas,
that is, expressions of a formal language upon which an inference system (no matter how poor or rich) models some kind
of reasoning. The goal of this paper is not to introduce a new nonmonotonic logic in this respect. Instead, we settle on a
generic framework that allows the various types of knowledge involved in ruleswith exceptions to be represented in a single
uniformway. Instantiating the framework to a given traditional nonmonotonic logic might require additional constraints on
the representation and inference formalisms.
Let us first concentrate on rules with exceptions under consistency tests. Our leading example is then expressed as If the
switch is on and if it can be consistently assumed that the lamp bulb is ok, then the light is on and consists of three parts: its
premises, its exceptions, and its conclusions. Accordingly, we thus aim at representing rules with exceptions in a uniform
way within a unified setting that is, among other things, meant to be general enough as to encompass e.g. default logic
while allowing us to instantiate it to other logical formalisms. It should also allow the representation of both monotonic
knowledge and rules involving consistency checks.
Given a logical language, a PEC rule (for Premises-Exceptions-Conclusions) is a triple consisting of three sets of formulas.
First, the premises, which are the necessary conditions for this rule to apply. Then, the exceptions, which call for consistency
tests. Finally, the conclusions, which list the claims that can be made whenever the rule applies.
Definition 1 (PEC-rule). A PEC rule is a tripleR = (P, E, C)where P = {ρ1, . . . , ρk} and C = {ς1, . . . , ςn} are consistent
sets of formulas and E = {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm} is a set of non-tautological formulas.
In the definition, we impose no constraint on the language: there may, or may not, be connectives such as negation,
conjunction, disjunction and the like. There may even be no connective at all. However, an underlying inference relation
‖−must be available. Of course, this means that the logical formalism used must have a form of tautology (please note the
subtlety here: this does notmean that the logical formalism usedmust have tautologies). In the rest of the paper, we assume
however the availability of the connectives of standard Boolean logic.
APEC rule canbe interpreted indifferentways, dependingonhow its set of premises and its set of conclusions are captured
logically (presumably, conjunctively or disjunctively). In the sequel, without loss of generality, we consider only unary PEC
rules, that is, PEC rules whose sets of premises and sets of conclusions are singletons (the involved formulas having been
assembled through the concerned conjunctive or disjunctiveparadigm). Abusing thenotation in order to improve readability,
we often omit curly brackets for these singletons.
Definition 2 (Unary PEC rule). A PEC ruleR = (P, E, C) is unary iff P and C are singleton sets.
Example 1. The PEC rule (switch_on, {¬lamp_bulb_ok}, light_on) is an encoding of the rule with exception “If the switch is
on and, consistently assuming that the lamp bulb is ok, then the light is on”.
Example 2. The PEC rule ({switch_on, lamp_bulb_ok},∅, light_on) is an encoding of a similar rule where the impossibility
to derive e.g. “lamp_bulb_ok" can block the inference of “light_on". In this respect, “¬lamp_bulb_ok" would be an exception
to the rule, which is however not to be included in the set of exceptions of the PEC rule, since it is not a consistency-based
exception.
Example 3. The PEC rule (⊤,∅, light_on) is an encoding of the fact “the light is on".
Example 4. The PEC rules (switch_on,∅, light_on), (switch_on ⊃ light_on,∅,∅) and (∅,∅, switch_on ⊃ light_on) are
various encodings of the exception-free rule “If the switch is on then the light is on".
As can be seen in the previous examples, exceptions to a rule that are supposed to be derived in the monotonic fragment
of the logic (vs. consistency checks) are not included in the set of exceptions in the PEC rule, which is devoted to exceptions
based on consistency checks. Indeed, we shall adopt a semantical view of formulas of the monotonic fragment of the logic
and e.g. allow for a clausal representation. Accordingly, the premise and conclusion status can be interchanged through
modus tollens and no information is given to interpret a literal as playing the specific role of an exception to a rule in a
clausal representation. Thus, the word “exception" will be reserved in this paper to “exception based on consistency check".
The various possible encodings of knowledge between premises and conclusions is similar to e.g. the well-known difference
in default logic between defaults with prerequisites and the corresponding prerequisite-free defaults [cf 4].
Also, ‖− is assumed to admit⊤ to represent effectively some formula.
4. Reasoning with and about PEC rules
Let us define a concept of a derivation for the very general language of PEC rules. Interestingly, it will not only allow us
to handle both monotonic and defeasible rules in the same setting, but it will also allow us to derive both of them.
A word of warning: in the following, ⊢ does not represent an inference relation. ⊢ α (resp. 6 ⊢ α) means that α has
(resp. has not) the status “inferred” within the derivation. Also, “not inferred within the derivation” does not mean “whose
negated form cannot be inferred using the inferred formulas occurring in the derivation” (which is a weaker notion, clearly
uninteresting). A word of terminology: ⊢ α and 6 ⊢ α are said to be signed formulas. Most naturally, ⊢ γ (resp. 6 ⊢ γ ) is said
to be positive (resp. negative).
Definition 3 (Derivation). Let Ŵ be a set of PEC rules and ℵ = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}, ς) one PEC rule. A derivation of ℵ from Ŵ
is a tree T whose nodes are standard signed Boolean formulas s.t.:
1. for all leaves of the form ⊢ α,
• either (⊤,∅, α) ∈ Ŵ,
• or (α1,∅, α2) ∈ Ŵ and α = α1 ⊃ α2,
• or α = ρ ,
2. for all leaves of the form 6 ⊢ β ,
β /∈ Cn({γ s.t. (⊤,∅, γ ) ∈ Ŵ} ∪ {γ1 ⊃ γ2 s.t. (γ1,∅, γ2) ∈ Ŵ} ∪ {α s.t. ⊢ α is a node of T}),
3. if 6 ⊢ β is a node then it is a leaf,
4. every node ⊢ α that is not a leaf has as parents,
• either a tuple (⊢ α1, . . . ,⊢ αk). In this case, α ∈ Cn({α1, . . . , αk}).
• or a tuple (⊢ α1, 6 ⊢ β1, . . . , 6 ⊢ βm)wherem ≥ 1. In this case, (α1, {β1, . . . , βm}, α) ∈ Ŵ.
5. ρ ∈ {α s.t. ⊢ α is a leaf of T} ∪ {⊤}, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn} = {β s.t. 6 ⊢ β is a node of T}, ⊢ ς is the root of T .
We note Ŵ|∼{ǫ1,...,ǫn}ℵ and, when {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn} is empty, Ŵ|∼ℵ.
Let us provide some intuitions and examples. First, consider the simple case of standard Boolean logic: items 2 and 3 are
ineffective because there are no negative nodes, while items 4 and 5 get simpler for the same reason. Items 1 & 2 require a
positive node to correspond either with a standard Boolean formula encoded inside a PEC rule of Ŵ, or with the premise ρ
of the PEC rule ℵ derived by the tree. This latter alternative translates the idea that a derivation allows a rule to be derived
through a construction that can assume that the premise of the rule is established. Item 4 gets simpler: only standard
deduction can take place in the tree. Indeed, the tree is then reduced to a standard derivation tree from Boolean logic. Item
5 defines the three components of the ℵ rule derived by the tree.
Example 5. Let Ŵ = {(a,∅, b), (⊤,∅, a), (b,∅, c)}. The tree from Fig. 1 is a derivation of (⊤,∅, c) from Ŵ (please note
that the first part of item 5 is satisfied by ρ ∈ {⊤}). Note that this tree is also a derivation of (a,∅, c), of (a ⊃ b,∅, c) and
(b ⊃ c,∅, c) from Ŵ.
Example 6. Let Ŵ = {(a,∅, b), (b,∅, c)}. The tree of Fig. 1 is a derivation of (a,∅, c) from Ŵ (please note that a plays the
role of an additional hypothesis). The tree of Fig. 1 is also a derivation of (a,∅, c) from Ŵ ∪ {(⊤,∅, a)}.
Example 7. Let Ŵ = {(⊤,∅, a), (b,∅, c)}. The tree from Fig. 1 is a derivation of (a ⊃ b,∅, c) from Ŵ. Note that ρ plays the
role of an additional hypothesis. This tree is also a derivation of (a ⊃ b,∅, c) from Ŵ ∪ {(⊤,∅,¬a)}, although the⊢ a node
in the tree is inconsistent with the¬a fact encoded through (⊤,∅,¬a).
Fig. 1. Tree from Examples 5–7.
Fig. 2. Tree from Example 8.
Fig. 3. Tree from Examples 9 and 10.
Fig. 4. Tree from Example 11.
Example 8. Let Ŵ = {(⊤,∅, a)}. The tree from Fig. 2 is a derivation of (¬a,∅, c) from Ŵ. Note that ρ plays the role of an
additional hypothesis.
When some PEC rules in Ŵ have a non-empty set of exceptions, derivation trees may capture reasoning under some
proviso(s) (meaning that there are possible exceptions). Item 2 guarantees reasoning to be consistent in the sense that
exception-free information from Ŵ (that may, or may not, occur as positive nodes) does not yield exceptions whose absence
is required for the reasoning developed to be acceptable (cf Example 10 with Cn being classical logic and Example 11 with
Cn being an arbitrary logic). This needs not prevent trivialization (in which case only derivations with no negative nodemay
exist). Item 3 indicates that consistency statements occur as hypotheses, they are not inferred. Item 4 makes sure that each
node, if not a leaf, is inferred from exception-free information and/or consistency hypotheses. Only inference steps from Cn
and rules (with exceptions) in Ŵ may apply. Lastly, item 5 specifies what components the PEC rule derived consists of:
• Its conclusion is the root of the derivation tree.
• Its exceptions exhaust all consistency hypotheses occurring in the derivation tree (cf Example 9).
• Its premise, if not ⊤, either amounts to some exception-free statement represented by a rule from Ŵ, or it is an extra
formula that plays the role of an additional hypothesis in the reasoning (cf Example 9).
Example 9. Let Ŵ = {(a∧ b, {d, e}, f ), (f ,∅, c)}.The tree from Fig. 3 is a derivation of (a∧ b, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ (please note
that ρ is a ∧ b that plays the role of an additional hypothesis and that {d, e} exhausts all negative nodes of the derivation
tree). The tree from Fig. 3 is not a derivation of (a∧b, {d, e, g}, c) fromŴ (item5 in the definition of a derivation fails because
g is listed as an exception of the derived PEC rule but 6 ⊢ g is not a node of the derivation tree). The tree from Fig. 3 is not a
derivation of (b, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ (here, item 5 is failed for a different reason: the purported ρ is b but ⊢ b is not a leaf of
the derivation tree).
Example 10. Let Ŵ = {(a ∧ b, {d, e}, f ), (f ,∅, c), (⊤,∅,¬f )}. If Cn is taken to be classical logic, the tree of Fig. 3 is not a
derivation of (a ∧ b, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ. The reason is that item 2 fails as follows. First, ⊢ f is a node of the derivation tree
hence f ∈ {α | ⊢ α is a node of T}. Second, (⊤,∅,¬f ) belongs to Ŵ hence⊤ ⊃ ¬f ∈ {γ1 ⊃ γ2 | (⊤,∅, γ1 ⊃ γ2) ∈ Ŵ}.
Third, item 2 then becomes β 6∈ Cn({f , . . . ,⊤ ⊃ ¬f }) that must be checked for β being d and e. However, as Cn is classical
logic, Cn({f , . . . ,⊤ ⊃ ¬f }) contains all formulas of the language, among them are d and e.
Example 11. LetŴ = {(a∧b, {d, e}, f ), (f ,∅, d), (d, {¬c}, c)}. The tree fromFig. 4 is not a derivation of (a∧b, {d, e,¬c}, c)
from Ŵ because item 2 is violated. First, ⊢ d is a node of the derivation tree hence d ∈ {α | ⊢ α is a node of T}. As 6 ⊢ d is a
leaf, β 6∈ Cn({d, . . .})must be checked for β being d and failure is obvious.
5. A versatile approach
Again, itmust be clear that thepresentwork isnot thedefinitionof anewnonmonotonic logic and its proof theory. Instead,
it is the definition of a framework expressive enough to capture an approach to the problem of overriding subsuming rules,
and general enough to be instantiated by a number of logical formalisms. Importantly, the concept of a derivation is only a
tool towards this aim which can be tailored to the proof theory of various logics.
For instance, and importantly, the above concept of a derivation does not match inference in Reiter’s default logic. First,
derivations have been defined independently of any extension concept and a derivation tree does not require all rules whose
premises are satisfied to be applied and occur in the tree. In particular, it happens that derivations exist although there is
no extension (cf Example 12).
Fig. 5. Tree from Example 12.
Fig. 6. Tree from Example 13.
Example 12. Let Ŵ = (1,6) be a default theory with1 = {⊤:a
¬a
, b:d,e
c
} and 6 = {b}. Let us represent Ŵ by the PEC rules
Ŵ′ = {(⊤, {¬a},¬a), (b, {¬d,¬e}, c), (⊤,∅, b)}. Ŵ has no extension because1 contains the default ⊤:a
¬a
, yet there exists
a derivation of the PEC rule (⊤, {¬d,¬e}, c) from Ŵ′, as can be seen from the tree of Fig. 5.
Similarly, Example 13 shows that it may happen that a formula is in no extension although there exists a derivation for it.
Example 13. Let Ŵ = (1,6) be a default theory with1 =
{
⊤:a
b
, a:¬b
c
}
and6 = {a}. Let us represent Ŵ by the set of PEC
rules Ŵ′ = {(⊤, {¬a}, b), (a, {b}, c), (⊤,∅, a)}. Ŵ has a single extension, i.e., E = Cn({a, b}). Although the formula c is not
in E, there exists a derivation of the PEC rule (⊤, {b}, c) from Ŵ′ as shown by the tree of Fig. 6.
Still, the concept of a derivation is powerful enough to capture credulous reasoning as modeled by default logic, as the
straightforward following property establishes it.
Property 1. Let Ŵ = (1,6) be a default theory and Ŵ. a set of PEC rules translating Ŵ. For every formula f belonging to an
extension E of Ŵ, there exists a derivation (⊤, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}, f ) from Ŵ
. where {¬ǫ1, . . . ,¬ǫn} is a subset of the justifications
of the generating defaults of Ŵ with respect to E.
Importantly, derivations are not meant to be optimal proofs: there is no endeavor as to avoid detours or to impose
shortcuts. Lastly, a concept of consistency can be introduced into the PEC framework.
Definition 4 (Consistency). Ŵ is consistent iff Ŵ 6|∼(⊤,∅,⊥).
As usual, a notion of consistency opens up a choice of negations. Whatever such a choice of a negation∼ for PEC rules, it
is likely to be such that bothŴ |∼ R andŴ |∼ ∼RwhileŴ 6|∼ R & ∼R (where & stands for some conjunction of PEC rules, again
whatever choice is made there) is possible. In purpose, we have thus left out any notion of inferential closure and similarly
any subgrouping of consequences, e.g. in forms of extensions à la default logic.
6. X-derivation
Weare now to extend the concept of a derivation by taking into account an additional hypothesis, which, in full generality,
can be a PEC rule (with or without exceptions). This concept will be useful in our approach to preempting rules since we
will have to consider what could be inferred provided that a given PEC rule that must not be subsumed is introduced inside
Ŵ. This full-fledged account is called an X-derivation, the details of which are explained and more generally discussed after
the formal definition below.
Definition 5 (X-derivation). Let Ŵ be a set of PEC rules and X a PEC rule. An X-derivation of ℵ = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}, ς) from
Ŵ is a tree T whose nodes are signed standard Boolean formulas s.t.:
1. for every leaf of the form ⊢ α,
• either (⊤,∅, α) ∈ Ŵ ∪ {X},
• or (α1,∅, α2) ∈ Ŵ ∪ {X} and α = α1 ⊃ α2,
• or α = ρ ,
2. for every leaf of the form 6 ⊢ β ,
β /∈ Cn({γ s.t. (⊤,∅, γ ) ∈ Ŵ ∪ {X}} ∪ {γ1 ⊃ γ2 s.t. (γ1,∅, γ2) ∈ Ŵ ∪ {X}}
∪{α s.t. ⊢ α is a node of T}),
3. if 6 ⊢ β is a node then it is a leaf,
4. every node ⊢ α that is not a leaf has as parents,
• either a tuple (⊢ α1, . . . ,⊢ αk). In this case, α ∈ Cn({α1, . . . , αk})
• or a tuple (⊢ α1, 6 ⊢ β1, . . . , 6 ⊢ βm)wherem ≥ 1. In this case, (α1, {β1, . . . , βm}, α) ∈ Ŵ ∪ {X}.
5. ρ ∈ {α s.t. ⊢ α is a leaf of T} ∪ {⊤}, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn} = {β s.t. 6 ⊢ β is a node of T} and ⊢ ς is the root of T .
We note Ŵ|∼
{ǫ1,...,ǫn}
X ℵ and Ŵ|∼Xℵwhen {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn} is empty.
Fig. 7. Tree from Examples 14, 15 and 17.
Fig. 8. Tree from Example 16.
Fig. 9. Tree from Example 18.
Actually, the PEC rule X can be regarded as supplementing the set of PEC rules Ŵ. Accordingly, if X = (⊤,∅,⊤), then an
X-derivation of ℵ from Ŵ happens to be a derivation of ℵ from Ŵ (cf Example 14). The role of each of the three components
of the derived ruleℵ is detailed by item 5. Importantly, item 1 expresses that if a positive leaf (tautologies aside) is not some
exception-free information encoded as a PEC rule from Ŵ then it is the premise of ℵ. Similarly to Definition 3, conditional
reasoning can be conducted using exception-free information as an extra hypothesis, turning it into a positive leaf. However,
the conditional piece can now be the X rule itself (more exactly, an equivalent form)when X represents a formula of classical
logic for instance (cf Example 16).When X is a PEC rule (̺, {ξ1, . . . , ξh}, ν) that does have exceptions, if its premise̺ stands
as a positive leaf (i.e.,⊢ ̺) not issued from a rule in Ŵ (i.e., there exists no (κ,∅, ζ ) in Ŵ such that κ ⊃ ζ be ̺), then ̺ turns
out to be the premise of ℵ (cf Example 18).
When X is used in the derivation and that the premise ̺ of X is not a leaf, then ̺ comes from a subproof in the tree (cf
Example 19).
In all cases, when X is used in the derivation, its premise occurs (as an hypothesis or an intermediate conclusion) higher
in the tree. Therefore, not only is X introduced as an extra hypothesis, but when it is mentioned in the tree, if its premise ̺
does not come from a subproof then⊢ ̺ occurs as a leaf (and is regarded as established); hence ̺ enters the set of premises
of ℵ (where ℵ is the PEC rule which is the conclusion of the derivation).
More generally, an X-derivation encompasses conditional reasoning in various forms because it involves consistency
hypotheses, it can include an extra rule X , and assumes the premise of ℵ (the PEC rule to be inferred).
Example 14. Let us return to Example 9, i.e., Ŵ = {(a∧ b, {d, e}, f ), (f ,∅, c)}. The tree of Fig. 7, reproduced from Example
9, is both a derivation and a (⊤,∅,⊤)-derivation of (a ∧ b, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ.
Example 15. Again, Ŵ = {(a ∧ b, {d, e}, f ), (f ,∅, c)} as in Example 9. The tree of Fig. 7 is a (⊤,∅, a ∧ b)-derivation of
(a ∧ b, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ, although in a rather vacuous way because the extra hypothesis X = (⊤,∅, a ∧ b) is left unused.
The tree of Fig. 7 is not a (⊤,∅, a ∧ b)-derivation of (⊤, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ. The reason is that item 1 in the definition of an
X-derivation is not satisfied because a∧ b is not of the form α1 ⊃ α2 while ρ = ⊤. In contrast, the tree in the next example
is a (⊤,∅, a ∧ b)-derivation of (⊤, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ.
Example 16. Let us still consider Ŵ = {(a ∧ b, {d, e}, f ), (f ,∅, c)}. The tree of Fig. 8 is a (⊤,∅, a ∧ b)-derivation of
(⊤, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ (informally meaning that assuming a ∧ b allows us to conclude c, unless d or e be the case).
Example17. Oncemore,Ŵ = {(a∧b, {d, e}, f ), (f ,∅, c)}. The tree of Fig. 7 is a (a∧b, {d, e}, f )-derivationof (a∧b, {d, e}, c)
fromŴ although ina rathervacuouswaybecauseX = (a∧b, {d, e}, f ) is inŴ. Indeed, the treeof Fig. 7 is alsoa (a∧b, {d, e}, f )-
derivation of (a ∧ b, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ′ where Ŵ′ is taken to be Ŵ \ {(a ∧ b, {d, e}, f )}.
Example 18. Let Ŵ = {(f , {e}, c)}. The tree of Fig. 9 is a (a∧ b, {d}, f )-derivation of (a∧ b, {d, e}, c) from Ŵ. Please observe
that the premise of X , namely a ∧ b, is not issued from Ŵ hence is also the premise of ℵ (here, X is (a ∧ b, {d}, f ) and ℵ is
(a ∧ b, {d, e}, c)).
Example 19. Let Ŵ = {(a ∧ b, {d, e}, f )}. The tree of Fig. 10 is a (f , {g}, c)-derivation of (a ∧ b, {d, e, g}, c) from Ŵ.
Fig. 10. Tree from Example 19.
Fig. 11. Tree from Example 20.
Fig. 12. Trees from Example 21.
7. PEC-implicants
PEC-implicants are intended to extend and adapt the usual concept of implicants modulo a set of formulas to the PEC
formalism andwith respect to the X-derivationmechanism. This concept will allow us to capture the idea of having one rule
entailing another rule, as part of our problem dealing with subsuming rules. However, we believe that the PEC-implicants
concepts canhavevarious other applications, as theygeneralize the standard-logic concept of implicants to amore expressive
generic nonmonotonic framework. Let us provide the definition before we explain the intuitions and motivations justifying
it.
Definition 6 (PEC-implicant). Let Ŵ be a set of unary PEC rules and R = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm}, ς) be a unary PEC rule. A unary
PEC rule R′ is a PEC-implicant of R modulo Ŵ iff there exists an R′-derivation D of (ρ, E∗, ς) from Ŵ s.t.
1. ∀e′ ∈ E∗, ∃e ∈ {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm} s.t. e ∈ Cn({e
′}),
2. ∀e′′ ∈ {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm} \ E
∗, e′′ 6∈ Cn{α | ⊢ α is a node of D}.
Definition 7 (Strict PEC-implicant). Let Ŵ be a set of unary PEC rules. Let R and R′ be two unary PEC rules. R′ is a strict
PEC-implicant of R modulo Ŵ iff R′ is a PEC-implicant of R and R is not a PEC-implicant of R′.
To simplify matters, Cn stands for classical logic in all of the following examples.
First, let us note that in themonotonic fragment of the PEC formalism, i.e. when all rules exhibit empty sets of exceptions,
neither item 1 nor item 2 does apply. Consequently, Definition 6 reduces to R′ is an implicant of R modulo Ŵ iff there exists
an R′-derivation of R from Ŵ (noted Ŵ|∼R′ R). Moreover, the derivation tree is a standard deduction one, possibly making
use ofR′ and where the premise ρ ofR can play the role of an additional hypothesis.
Example 20. Let Ŵ = {(g ∧ h,∅, c), (⊤,∅, h)} be a set of PEC rules. Let R = (a ∧ b,∅, c) and R′ = (a,∅, g) be two PEC
rules. R′ is a PEC- implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ. Indeed, the tree of Fig. 11 is an R′-derivation of R from Ŵ. As a leaf of the tree,
the premises ofR (namely a ∧ b) are thus assumed to be satisfied when the derivation is performed.
Example 21. LetŴ = {(g∧h,∅, c), (⊤,∅, h)} a set of PEC rules. LetR = (a∧b,∅, c) andR′ = (⊤,∅, g) be two PEC rules.
The leftmost tree of Fig. 12 does not makeR′ to be a PEC-implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ. Indeed, this tree is not anR′-derivation
ofR from Ŵ since the premise ofR (i.e., a∧ b) does not belong to the set of positive nodes of the tree. This violates the first
part of item 7 in Definition 5. Note thatR′ is a (strict) PEC-implicant of (⊤,∅, c) through the aforementioned tree. Now,R′
is a PEC-implicant of R modulo Ŵ through the rightmost tree of Fig. 12. Indeed, this tree is an R′-derivation of R from Ŵ.
Note that, in this tree, we assume that the premise ofR is satisfied, although it does not play a significant role here.
Example 22. Let Ŵ = {(a,∅, c)} be a set of PEC rules. Let R = (a ∧ b,∅, c) and R′ = (⊤,∅, x) be two PEC rules. R′ is
a PEC-implicant of R modulo Ŵ. Indeed, the tree from Fig. 13 is an R′-derivation of R from Ŵ.Note that this tree is also a
derivation ofR from Ŵ.
Fig. 13. Tree from Example 22.
Fig. 14. Tree from Example 23.
Fig. 15. Tree from Example 24.
Fig. 16. Tree from Example 25.
Let us now consider the general case. When PEC rules with non empty sets of exceptions are considered, items 1 and 2
of Definition 6 apply. Intuitively, it is necessary to take into account the possible links between the exceptions ofR and the
exceptions of R′. These links must be such that if R′ does not apply due to one of its exceptions thenRmust not apply. On
the contrary, if R does not apply due to one of its exceptions, it might be the case that R′ applies. Thus, on the one hand,
all exceptions of R′ must be as strong as at least one exception of R (see ¬d, Example 23, ¬d ∧ ¬f , Examples 24 and 25).
On the other hand, the exceptions occurring in the derivation tree used to show the implication and that are not implied by
an exception ofR′ must also be as strong as at least one exception ofR (see¬e ∧ ¬h, Example 25). Thus, it is necessary to
consider the possible links between the exceptions of R and the nodes in the derivation tree showing the implication. Our
intuition leads us to require that the proof of the implication (through the derivation tree) does not entail an exception ofR
(see¬e, Example 26 et e, Example 27).
Thus, showing that R′ is a PEC-implicant of R = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm}, ς)modulo Ŵ, amounts to showing that there exists
anR′-derivation of (ρ, E∗, ς)where E∗ consists of the negative nodes of the tree (belonging or not to the set of exceptions of
R
′), it must be the case that each element of E∗ implies an exception ofR (item 1) and it must be the case that no exception
ofR that is not in E∗ is a logical consequence of the positive nodes in the tree. Note that if there exists a derivation ofR from
Ŵ (according to Definition 3) then for some PEC rulesR′,R′ is a PEC-implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ, withoutR′ playing any role
in the derivation (see Example 29).
Example 23. Let Ŵ be an empty set of PEC rules. Let R = (a ∧ b, {¬d,¬e}, c) and R′ = (a, {¬d}, c) be two PEC rules. R′
is a PEC-implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ through the tree of Fig. 14. Indeed, this tree is an R′-derivation of (a ∧ b, {¬d}, c) from
Ŵ. In accordance with item 1,¬d (exception of R′) belongs to the set of exceptions of R and in accordance with item 2,¬e
cannot be deduced from {a, a ∧ b, c}.
Example 24. Let Ŵ be an empty set of PEC rules. LetR = (a, {¬d,¬e}, c) andR′ = (a, {¬d∧¬f }, c) be two PEC rules.R′
is a PEC-implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ, as shown by the tree of Fig. 15. Indeed, this tree is anR′-derivation of (a, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c)
from Ŵ. In accordance with item 1,¬d∧¬f (exception ofR′) implies¬d (an exception ofR) and in accordance with item 2,
neither ¬d nor¬e (the members of {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm}) are implied by {a, c} (the formulas attached to the positive nodes of the
tree).
Example 25. Let Ŵ = {(a, {¬e ∧ ¬h}, g)} be a set of PEC rules. Let R = (a, {¬d,¬e}, c) and R′ = (g, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c) be
two PEC rules.R′ is a PEC-implicant ofRmoduloŴ, as illustrated by the tree of Fig. 16. Indeed, this tree is anR′-derivation of
(a, {¬d∧¬f ,¬e∧¬h}, c) fromŴ. In accordance with item 1,¬d∧¬f (which is in E∗ and is an exception ofR′) implies¬d
(an exception ofR) and¬e∧¬h (which is E∗ and is an exception of the only PEC rule ofŴ) implies¬e (an exception ofR). In
accordance with item 2, neither¬d nor¬e (the members of {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm}) are implied by {a, c, g} (formulas corresponding
to the positive nodes of the tree).
Example 26. Let Ŵ = {(a,∅,¬e), (¬e,∅, f )} be a set of PEC rules. Let R = (a ∧ b, {¬d,¬e}, c) and R′ = (f , {¬d}, c)
be two PEC rules. R′ is not a PEC-implicant of R modulo Ŵ through the tree of Fig. 17. Indeed, although this tree is an
R
′-derivation of (a ∧ b, {¬d}, c) from Ŵ, the item 2 from Definition 6 is not respected: ⊢ ¬e is a node of the tree although
¬e is an exception ofR.
Fig. 17. Tree from Example 26.
Fig. 18. Tree from Example 27.
Fig. 19. Tree from Example 28.
Fig. 20. Tree from Example 29.
Example 27. Let Ŵ = {(a, {e}, f )} be a set of PEC rules. Let R = (a ∧ b, {¬d,¬e}, c) and R′ = (f , {¬d}, c) be two PEC
rules. R′ is not a PEC-implicant of R modulo Ŵ through the tree of Fig. 18. Although the latter one is an R′-derivation of
(a ∧ b, {¬d, e}, c) from Ŵ, item 1 from Definition 6 is violated: e is a formula of E∗ from which no formula from {¬d,¬e}
can be inferred.
Example 28. Let Ŵ be an empty set of PEC rules. Let R = (a, {¬b}, b) and R′ = (⊤,∅, a ⊃ b) be two PEC rules. R′ is a
PEC-implicant ofRmoduloŴ through the tree from Fig. 19. Indeed, this tree is anR′-derivation of (a,∅, b) fromŴ. Item 1 is
satisfied since E∗ is empty. Moreover, in accordance with item 2,¬b cannot be deduced from {a, b, a ⊃ b} (i.e., the formulas
attached to the positive nodes of the tree).
Example 29. Let Ŵ = {(a, {d, e}, c)} be a set of PEC rules. LetR = (a ∧ b, {d, e}, c) andR′ = (x, {z}, y) be two PEC rules.
R
′ is a PEC-implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ. Indeed, the tree from Fig. 20 is anR′-derivation ofR from Ŵ. Let us stress that hereR′
does not play any role in the derivation: This tree is also a derivation ofR from Ŵ.
Fairly weak requirements about Cn are enough to show that being a PEC-implicant defines a pre-order. Of special interest
then is the case that two PEC rules are PEC-implicants of each other: They surely are equivalent in a strong sense closely
related to Cn-equivalence of exceptions. It is straightforward to obtain such a result, as follows.
Property 2. Given two unary PEC rulesR = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm}, ς) andR
′ = (ρ′, {ǫ′1, . . . , ǫ
′
n}, ς
′), ifR is a PEC-implicant of
R
′ modulo Ŵ, andR′ is a PEC-implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ where Ŵ = ∅ then:
1. ρ‖−ρ′ and ρ′‖−ρ ,
2. ∀ǫi ∈ {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm}, ∃ǫj, ǫ
′
k where ǫj ∈ {ǫ1, . . . , ǫm} and ǫ
′
k ∈ {ǫ
′
1, . . . , ǫ
′
n}, s.t. ǫj‖−ǫi and ǫj‖−ǫ
′
k and ǫ
′
k‖−ǫj .
The idea underlying the previous result is to extend to PEC rules the idea that when two objects are symmetrically related
with each other through a given relation, then they must be equivalent in some sense (other than the trivial equivalence
obtained from the binary relation under consideration). In particular, item 2means that exceptions inR andR′ are the same,
up to logical equivalence (by subsumption, there can be more exceptions inR or inR′, though).
8. Essential implicants and prime implicants
From now on, we write implicant as a shorthand for PEC-implicant.
We have seen that some implicants only play a superfluous role in the X-derivation used to show the implication.
According to our goal to insert a PEC rule while ensuring that rules subsuming it are rejected, we should not discard those
implicants. To this end, we define a concept of essential implicant that does not select them.
Weassume that anoperator\ is available in thePEC framework. Intuitively,\ is a syntactical contractionoperator between
a set of PEC rules and a PEC rule: Ŵ \ R contracts Ŵ fromR (and from any equivalent PEC rule toR, in accordance with the
equivalence concept introduced at the end of the previous Section).
Fig. 21. Trees from Example 30.
Definition 8 (Essential implicant). LetŴ be a set of PEC rules,R andR′ be PEC rules.R′ is an essential implicant ofRmodulo
Ŵ iff there exists Ŵ′ ⊆ Ŵ \ {R} s.t. :
1. R′ is an implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ′,
2. there does not exist any derivation of an implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ′ \ {R′}.
Definition 9 (Strict essential implicant). Let Ŵ be a set of PEC rules. Let R and R′ be two PEC rules. R′ is a strict essential
implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ iffR′ is an essential implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ andR is not an essential implicant ofR′ modulo Ŵ.
Then, for all strict essential implicantsR′ ofRmoduloŴ, we say thatR′ is a prime implicant ofRmoduloŴ if there does
not exist any ruleR′′ that is an essential implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ, s.t.R′ would be one of its essential implicant modulo Ŵ.
Definition 10 (Prime implicant). Let Ŵ be a set of PEC rules,R andR′ be two PEC rules.R′ is a prime implicant ofRmodulo
Ŵ iffR′ is a strict essential implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ and there does not exist any PEC ruleR′′ s.t.:
1. R′′ is a strict essential implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ,
2. R′ is a strict essential implicant ofR′′ modulo Ŵ.
Let us provide the reader with some intuitions about the above definitions. First, consider the specific case where Ŵ is
empty. The definition for essential implicant gets simpler: item 2 does not apply and only one Ŵ′ exists (and it is empty).
Intuitively, when Ŵ is empty, any implicant R′ of R modulo Ŵ is an essential implicant of R modulo Ŵ (see Example 30).
Note that in this case, a prime implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ is a strict implicant R′ of Rmodulo Ŵ s.t. there does not exist any
other strict implicant R′′ of R of which R′ is a strict implicant modulo Ŵ. Intuitively, when Ŵ is not empty, in order for an
implicant of R′ of Rmodulo Ŵ to be an essential one, it is also necessary, leaving R′ apart, that no way to derive R (or one
of its implicants) remains.
Example 30. Let Ŵ be an empty set of PEC rules and R = (a ∧ b, {¬d,¬e}, c) be a PEC rule. First, consider the essential
implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ. Note that Ŵ′ = Ŵ \ {R} = Ŵ = ∅. The PEC ruleR′ = (a, {¬d∧¬f }, c) is an essential implicant
ofRmoduloŴ. On the one hand,R′ is an implicant ofRmoduloŴ′. Indeed, as the leftmost tree of Fig. 21 shows, there exists
anR′-derivation of (a∧ b, {¬d∧¬f }, c) from Ŵ′. On the other hand, there cannot exist any derivation ofR or of one of its
implicants from Ŵ′ \ {R′} since Ŵ = ∅. Similarly, the PEC rule R′′ = (a,∅, c) is an essential implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ. On
the one hand,R′′ is an implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ′. Indeed, as the middle tree of Fig. 21 shows, there exists anR′′-derivation
of (a∧ b,∅, c) from Ŵ′. On the other hand, there cannot exist any derivation ofR or of any of its implicants, from Ŵ′ \ {R′′}.
Now, consider the essential implicants of R′ modulo Ŵ. Note that Ŵ′ = Ŵ \ {R′} = Ŵ = ∅. First, it is easy to see that R is
not an essential implicant ofR′ moduloŴ.R′ is thus a strict essential implicant ofRmoduloŴ. Moreover,R′′ is an essential
implicant of R′ modulo Ŵ. On the one hand, R′′ is an implicant of R′ modulo Ŵ′. Indeed, there exists an R′′-derivation of
(a,∅, c) from Ŵ′, as the rightmost tree of Fig. 21 shows. On the other hand, there cannot exist any derivation ofR′ or of any
of its implicants, modulo Ŵ′ \ {R′′} since Ŵ′ \ {R′′} is empty. Consider now the essential implicants of R′′ modulo Ŵ. Note
that Ŵ′ = Ŵ \ {R′′} = Ŵ = ∅. It is easy to see that, at the same time, R′ and R are not essential implicants of R′′ modulo
Ŵ′. Thus, R′′ is both a strict essential implicant of R and of R′ modulo Ŵ. Consequently, R′′ is not a prime implicant of R
modulo Ŵ. Also, note that althoughR′ is a strict essential implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ, R′ is not necessarily a prime implicant
of Rmodulo Ŵ. Indeed, other strict essential implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ can exist, of which R′ is a strict essential implicant
modulo Ŵ (e.g., the PEC rule R′′′ = (a ∧ b, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c) is a strict essential implicant of R modulo Ŵ and R′ is a strict
essential implicant ofR′′′ modulo Ŵ).
Example 31. Let Ŵ = {(a, {¬d,¬e}, c)} be a set of PEC rules andR = (a∧ b, {¬d,¬e}, c) a PEC rule. First, let us consider
the essential implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ. Note that here Ŵ \ {R} = Ŵ. Thus, there can only exist two different Ŵ′, namely:
• Ŵ′1 = Ŵ,
• Ŵ′2 = ∅.
The PEC rule R′ = (x, {¬z}, y) is not an essential implicant of R modulo Ŵ. First, consider Ŵ′1. On the one hand, R
′ is an
implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ′1. Indeed, as shown in the tree of Fig. 22, there exists anR
′-derivation ofRmodulo Ŵ′1. But on the
other hand, as the same tree shows it, there exists a derivation of R modulo Ŵ′1 \ {R
′} (note that Ŵ′1 \ {R
′} = Ŵ). Now,
consider Ŵ′2. Clearly, there does not exist any R
′-derivation of R modulo Ŵ′2. Thus, R
′ is not an implicant of R modulo Ŵ′2.
Fig. 22. Tree from Example 31.
Fig. 23. Trees from Example 32.
Accordingly,R′ is not a strict essential implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ and it thus not a prime implicant. On the contrary, the PEC
rule R′′ = (a, {¬d,¬e}, c) is an essential implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ. On the one hand, R′′ is an implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ′1.
Indeed, the tree from Fig. 22 is an R′′-derivation of Rmodulo Ŵ′1. On the other hand, there does not exist any derivation of
R or of one of its implicants modulo Ŵ′1 \ {R
′′}. Indeed in this case Ŵ′1 \ {R
′′} = ∅. Consider now the essential implicants
R
′′ modulo Ŵ. Note that in this case Ŵ \ {R′′} = ∅. Thus, there exists only one Ŵ′ and it is empty. It is easy to see that R is
not an essential implicant of R′′ modulo Ŵ. R′′ is thus a strict essential implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ. Thus, amongst {R′,R′′},
onlyR′′ and its equivalent forms can be candidates for being prime implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ.
Example 32. LetŴ = {(a, {¬d∧¬f }, c∧x)} be a set of PEC rules andR = (a∧b, {¬d,¬e}, c) one PEC rule. First, consider
the essential implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ. Note that here Ŵ \ {R} = Ŵ. Thus, only two different Ŵ′ exist, namely:
• Ŵ′1 = Ŵ,
• Ŵ′2 = ∅.
The PEC ruleR′ = (x, {¬d∧¬f }, c) is not an essential implicant ofRmoduloŴ. First, considerŴ′1. On the one handR
′ is an
implicant ofRmoduloŴ′1. Indeed, as the leftmost tree of Fig. 23 shows, there exists anR
′-derivation of (a∧b, {¬d∧¬f }, c)
modulo Ŵ′1. On the other hand, as the rightmost tree of Fig. 23 shows, there exists a derivation of (a ∧ b, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c),
an implicant of R, modulo Ŵ′1 \ {R
′} (note that Ŵ′1 \ {R
′} = Ŵ). Now, consider Ŵ′2. It is clear that there does not exist
any R′-derivation of R modulo Ŵ′2. Thus, R
′ is not an implicant of R modulo Ŵ′2. Consequently, R
′ is not a strict essential
implicant of R modulo Ŵ hence is not a prime implicant. On the contrary, the PEC rule R′′ = (a, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c ∧ x) is an
essential implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ. On the one hand, R′′ is an implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ′1. Indeed, the rightmost tree of Fig.
23 is an R′′-derivation of (a ∧ b, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c)modulo Ŵ′1. On the other hand, there does not exist any derivation of R or
of any of its implicants modulo Ŵ′1 \ {R
′′}. Indeed, in this case, Ŵ′1 \ {R
′′} = ∅. Now, consider the essential implicants of
R
′′ modulo Ŵ. Note that here Ŵ \ {R′′} = ∅. Thus, there exists only one Ŵ′ and it is empty. It is easy to see that R is not an
essential implicant ofR′′ modulo Ŵ.R′′ is thus a strict essential implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ. Thus, amongst {R′,R′′}, onlyR′′
and its equivalent forms can be candidates for being prime implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ.
Example 33. Let Ŵ = {(a, {¬d∧¬f }, c), (a∨ h,∅, c)} be a set of PEC rules andR = (a∧ b, {¬d,¬e}, c) a PEC rule. First,
consider the essential implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ. Note that here Ŵ \ {R} = Ŵ. Thus, there exists four different Ŵ′, namely:
• Ŵ′1 = Ŵ,
• Ŵ′2 = {(a, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c)},
• Ŵ′3 = {(a ∨ h,∅, c)},
• Ŵ′4 = ∅.
The PEC rule R′ = (a, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c) is an essential implicant of R modulo Ŵ. On the one hand, R′ is an implicant of R
modulo Ŵ′2 (or Ŵ
′
4). Indeed, as the leftmost tree of Fig. 24 shows it, there exists an R
′-derivation of (a ∧ b, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c)
modulo Ŵ′2 (or Ŵ
′
4). On the other hand, there does not exist any derivation ofR or of one of its implicants modulo Ŵ
′
2 \ {R
′}
since Ŵ′2 \ {R
′} = Ŵ′4 = ∅. Similarly, the PEC rule R
′′ = (a ∨ h,∅, c) is an essential implicant of Rmodulo Ŵ. On the one
handR′′ is an implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ′3 (or Ŵ
′
4). Indeed, as the middle tree of Fig. 24 shows it, there exists anR
′′-derivation
of (a ∧ b,∅, c) modulo Ŵ′3 (or Ŵ
′
4). On the other hand, there does not exist any derivation of R or of one of its implicants
modulo Ŵ′3 \ {R
′′} since Ŵ′3 \ {R
′′} = Ŵ′4 = ∅. Now consider the essential implicants of R
′ modulo Ŵ. Note that here
Ŵ \ {R′} = {(a ∨ h,∅, c)}. Thus, there exists only two different Ŵ′, namely:
• Ŵ′1 = {(a ∨ h,∅, c)},
• Ŵ′2 = ∅.
First, it is easy to see thatR is not an essential implicant ofR′ modulo Ŵ.R′ is thus a strict essential implicant ofRmodulo
Ŵ. Now, R′′ is an essential implicant of R′ modulo Ŵ. On the one hand, R′′ is an implicant of R′ modulo Ŵ′1. Indeed, as the
Fig. 24. Trees from Example 33.
rightmost tree of Fig. 24 shows, there exists anR′′-derivation of (a,∅, c)moduloŴ′1. On the other hand, there does not exist
any derivation ofR′ or of one of its implicantsmoduloŴ′1 \{R
′′} sinceŴ′1 \{R
′′} = ∅. Now consider the essential implicants
ofR′′ modulo Ŵ. Note that here Ŵ \ {R′′} = {(a, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c)}. Thus, there exist only two different Ŵ′, namely:
• Ŵ′1 = {(a, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c)},
• Ŵ′2 = ∅.
Again, it is easy to see thatR is not an essential implicant ofR′′moduloŴ.R′′ is thus a strict essential implicant ofRmodulo
Ŵ. However,R′ is not an essential implicant ofR′′ modulo Ŵ. To show it, it is useful to consider the subsets Ŵ′ of Ŵ \ {R′′} :
• Consider Ŵ′1 = {(a, {¬d ∧ ¬f }, c)}. Clearly,R
′ is not an implicant ofR′′ modulo Ŵ′1.
• Consider Ŵ′2 = ∅. Clearly,R
′ is not an implicant ofR′′ modulo Ŵ′2.
Thus,R′′ is a strict essential implicant ofR′ modulo Ŵ. Consequently,R′′ cannot be a prime implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ
9. Overriding subsuming rules
We are now ready to introduce our approach to override subsuming rules. To override the subsuming rules of a PEC rule
R and make R to preempt, it is presumably not sufficient to “withdraw” all prime implicants of R and insert R. Indeed, as
shown in the next example, there may remain in the resulting Ŵ some information of a self-conflicting change, e.g. so that
whenever R is derivable, one of its strict PEC-implicants is also derivable.
Example 34. Let Ŵ = {(⊤,∅, c ⊃ a ∨ b)} andR = (⊤,∅, a ∨ b ∨ c). Assume that we want to augment Ŵ withR in such
a way that R is not subsumed. Clearly, there is no prime implicant of R in Ŵ. However, introducing R in Ŵ will allow a ∨ b
to be deduced, which is a strict implicant of a ∨ b ∨ c.
Accordingly, the process will thus be a little more elaborate. The intuition behind the approach is best explained in the
Boolean framework: assume that a formula g is to be introduced insideŴ so that g is not subsumed. In the case g is consistent
with Ŵ, it is necessary to retract g ⊃ f for every prime implicant f of g. Intuitively, when g is then inserted inside Ŵ, no way
to infer f remains available. Such an idea has been explored for the Boolean framework in [3].
Let us extend this idea to the full PEC-framework and X-derivationmechanism. In the sequel, we assume an operator \ to
be available in the PEC framework with the following features. Intuitively, \ is a kind of contraction operator which applies
to a set of PEC rules and to a pair of PEC rules: Ŵ \ (R, R′) is intended to contract Ŵ of R′ in the presence of R. Formally, it is
expected to enjoy the following properties.
1. Ŵ \ (R,R′) 6|∼E
R
R
′,
2. Ŵ \ (R,R′)|∼ER′′ implies Ŵ|∼ER′′,
3. Ŵ \ (R,R′) = Cn(Ŵ \ (R,R′)),
4. ForR = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}, ς)where n ≥ 1, if ǫi 6∈ Cn({ρ, ς}) for i = 1..n then
Ŵ \ (R,R′) 6|∼(ρ ∧ ς,∅, ǫi) for i = 1..n,
whereR,R′,R′′ are PEC rules and Ŵ is a set of PEC rules that does not need to be consistent. The last property is not natural
for a pure contraction operator. However, it proves convenient in allowing us to state the following natural definition.
Definition 11. LetR′ be a prime PEC-implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ.
Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R =def Ŵ \ (R,R
′) ∪ {R}.
Theorem 1. Let Ŵ be a set of PEC rules. LetR = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}, ς) a PEC rule s.t. n ≥ 1 and s.t. ǫi 6∈ Cn({ρ, ς}) for i = 1..n.
LetR′ be a prime implicant ofRmodulo Ŵ.
• Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R is consistent,
• Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R|∼
ǫ
R,
• Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R 6|∼
ǫ
R
′.
Proof. First let us show that Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R|∼
ǫ
R. According to Definition 11, R ∈ Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R. Thus, we can build a tree whose
root is⊢ ς and whose parents are⊢ ρ and 6 ⊢ ǫ1, . . . , 6 ⊢ ǫn. This tree clearly obeys all conditions of Definition 3: only item
2 requires more analysis. We need to prove that ǫi 6∈ Cn({γ s.t. (⊤,∅, γ ) ∈ Ŵ \ (R,R
′)} ∪ {γ1 ⊃ γ2 s.t. (γ1,∅, γ2) ∈
Ŵ \ (R,R′)} ∪ {ρ, ς}).This is equivalent to ǫi 6∈ Cn({γ1 ⊃ γ2 t.q. (γ1,∅, γ2) ∈ Ŵ \ (R,R
′)} ∪ {ρ, ς}) and to {γ1 ⊃ γ2 t.q.
(γ1,∅, γ2) ∈ Ŵ \ (R,R
′)} 6|H ρ ∧ ς ⊃ ǫi. The latter condition is satisfied through the constraint that \(R,R
′)must obey,
since 6|H ρ ∧ ς ⊃ ǫi.
Let us address the consistency issue ofŴ⊕〉R′〈R.Wehave shown that {γ1 ⊃ γ2 s.t. (γ1,∅, γ2) ∈ Ŵ\(R,R
′)} 6|H ρ∧ς ⊃ ǫi.
Thus, {γ1 ⊃ γ2 s.t. (γ1,∅, γ2) ∈ Ŵ \ (R,R
′)} 6|H ⊥. But, if a derivation of (⊤,∅,⊥) from Ŵ \ (R,R′) were to exist, then
it would contain positive nodes only (item 5 of Definition 3), which, due to item 4 of the aforementioned definition, would
entail {γ1 ⊃ γ2 s.t. (γ1,∅, γ2) ∈ Ŵ \ (R,R
′)} |H ⊥, which we just have proved to be impossible. Thus, there does not
exist any derivation of (⊤,∅,⊥) from Ŵ \ (R,R′). Accordingly, there does not exist any derivation of (⊤,∅,⊥) from
Ŵ \ (R,R′)∪ {R} because such a derivation would have⊢ ⊥ as its a root, which would violate item 2 from Definition 3 for
all ǫi ofR (there exists at least one since n ≥ 1).
Let us finish the proof by showing that Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R 6|∼
ǫ
R
′. Since R′ is a prime implicant of R modulo Ŵ, Definition 11 can
apply and Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R = Ŵ \ (R,R
′) ∪ {R}. But \(R,R′) satisfies the constraint Ŵ \ (R,R′) 6|∼ǫ
R
R
′. In accordance with
Definition 5, there does not exist any R-derivation of R′ from Ŵ \ (R,R′). Thus, there does not exist any derivation of R′
from Ŵ \ (R,R′) ∪ {R}. This means Ŵ ⊕〉R′〈 R 6|∼
ǫ
R
′. 
The next step consists in iterating the above process on all primes implicants of R. Assuming that the \ operator is
extended so that it applies to all the elements of its second argument, which is now a set of PEC rules; we only need one
more definition.
Let Y be the set of prime implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ.
Definition 12. Ŵ ⊕〉Y〈 R =def Ŵ \ (R,Y) ∪ {R}.
It is easy to show that this definition enjoys the properties attached to the⊕〈R′〉 operator (see Theorem 1). Accordingly,
the set of PEC rules delivered by Ŵ⊕〈Y〉 R is consistent; it allowsR to be deduced, while, at the same time, it preventsR to
be subsumed.
Theorem 2. Let Ŵ be a set of PEC rules. Let R = (ρ, {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}, ς) be a PEC rule s.t. n ≥ 1 and s.t. ǫi 6∈ Cn({ρ, ς}) for
i = 1..n. Let Y be the set of prime implicants ofRmodulo Ŵ.
• Ŵ ⊕〉Y〈 R is consistent,
• Ŵ ⊕〉Y〈 R|∼
ǫ
R,
• Ŵ ⊕〉Y〈 R 6|∼
ǫ
R
′,∀R′ ∈ Y .
10. Conclusions and future work
Thecontributionof this paper is at least twofold. First, a unified frameworkhasbeenpresented that allowsbothmonotonic
knowledge and defeasible rules to be represented and reasoned about in a uniformway. Derivation tools have been defined
allowing to reason and infer both kinds of knowledge indifferently. The next step will be to address algorithmic aspects
of X-derivations and associated inference, within the propositional setting. Also, the X-derivation concept implements the
possibility to state defeasible rules as extra assumptions, which are coming in addition to the defeasible character of rules
with exceptions. We believe that this two-level form of hypothetical reasoning could be further explored and refined. Also,
a whole family of forms of implicants could be devised for defeasible rules, depending on the actual form of reasoning that
is modeled and on the intended actual epistemological roles of the involved exceptions, premises and conclusion. Second,
this framework has been exploited to solve a specific problem in knowledge representation and reasoning that has not
received much attention so far. Namely, how could new information override the relevant subsuming information which is
currently available? We claim that such an issue should not be taken for granted. Indeed, in real life we do often get new
knowledge that is logically weaker but that appearsmore informative than the previously recorded one, and should therefore
be preferred.
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